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Abstract 
Analyses of the effects of election outcomes on the economy have been hampered by the problem 
that economic outcomes also influence elections.  We sidestep these problems by analyzing 
movements in economic indicators caused by clearly exogenous changes in expectations about the 
likely winner during Election Day.  Analyzing high frequency financial fluctuations following the 
release of flawed exit poll data on Election Day 2004, and then during the vote count, we find that 
markets anticipated higher equity prices, interest rates and oil prices and a stronger dollar under a 
Bush presidency than under Kerry.  A similar Republican-Democrat differential was also observed 
for the 2000 Bush-Gore contest.  Prediction market based analyses of all Presidential elections since 
1880 also reveal a similar pattern of partisan impacts, suggesting that electing a Republican 
President raises equity valuations by 2-3 percent, and that since Reagan, Republican Presidents have 
tended to raise bond yields. 
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I.  Introduction 
 
Do election outcomes affect the macroeconomy?  Theoretical predictions differ, as canonical 
rational-choice political science models predict policy convergence,1 while more recent models of  
citizen-candidates [Besley and Coate 1997], party factions [Roemer, 1999], and strategic extremism 
[Glaeser et. al. 2006] predict divergence.  Empirical evidence is mixed, reflecting the difficulty of 
establishing robust stylized facts about actual economic outcomes from a small number of 
Presidential election cycles.2  
We sidestep this limitation by exploiting two recent financial market developments: the 
electronic trading of equity index and other futures while votes are being counted on Election 
Night;3 and the emergence of a liquid prediction market tracking the election outcome.  Our analysis 
also benefits from natural experiments created by flawed, but widely believed, exit poll data.  In 
2004, exit polls released around 3pm Eastern time predicted a Bush defeat, and the price of a 
security paying $10 if he was reelected fell from $5.5 to $3.  As votes were counted that evening, 
the same security rallied and reached $9.5 by midnight.  High-frequency data shows the value of 
financial assets closely tracking these changes in expectations, allowing us to make precise and 
unbiased inferences of the effect of Bush’s reelection on many economic variables.  Similar events 
occurred in 2000, although without a prediction market precisely tracking changes in beliefs. 
We proceed by analyzing the 2004 election, comparing the results from our high-frequency 
analysis with a more traditional pre-election analysis of daily data.  We find that Bush’s reelection 
led to modest increases in equity prices, nominal and real interest rates, oil prices, and the dollar, 
and that the biases in a more traditional research design would be substantial.  We then conduct a 
                                                 
1  These models start with Hotelling [1929] and Downs [1957] and include more recent models of probabilistic voting 
[Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987] and lobbying [Baron, 1994].  
2 Alesina, Roubini and Cohen [1997] document faster economic growth under Democratic administrations (particularly 
in the first half of an administration), although Democrats have governed during periods of lower inflation, casting 
doubt on the interpretation that these differences reflect differences in aggregate demand management. 
3 Overnight trading of equity index futures began on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange’s Globex platform in 1993.  
Prior to 1984, U.S. equity and bond markets were closed on Election Day. 
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similar analysis of the 2000 election, finding partisan effects consistent with our analysis of the 
2004 election.  Finally, we turn to a longer sample, analyzing event returns surrounding elections 
back to 1880. We find a remarkably consistent pattern of election outcomes affecting financial 
markets.  Although our finding that elections affect financial markets suggests that they also affect 
economic policies and welfare, we caution that we can only speak to the effects of the elections we 
analyze. Further, the effect of a candidate on a variable such as equity prices may differ from their 
effect on economic welfare. 
Past work examining the correlation of financial markets and expectations about political 
outcomes has used lower-frequency, pre-election data.  For instance, Herron [2000] found that in the 
days leading up to the 1992 British election changes in the odds of a Labour victory were correlated 
with changes in British stock indices, leading him to infer that the election of Labour would have 
caused stock prices to decline by 5%-11%.  However, this correlation may instead reflect changing 
expectations about the economy driving changing expectations about the re-election of the 
incumbent.  Knight [2006] sought to identify a causal effect by examining whether the difference in 
returns between “Pro-Bush” and “Pro-Gore” stock portfolios were correlated with the probability of 
Bush winning the 2000 election.  This approach is less likely to be affected by reverse-causality, 
since an improvement in the economic outlook for a particular group of companies (e.g., defense) is 
unlikely to increase the re-election chances of an incumbent. Even so, the identification of partisan 
effects in this setting relies on the absence of unobserved factors affecting both the pricing of these 
portfolios and re-election prospects, and this might be questionable.4  Moreover, by design, this 
empirical strategy cannot speak to the effects of alternative candidates on aggregates. 
 
                                                 
4 For instance, suppose that an election features a pro- and anti- war candidate, and the pro-war candidate is a more 
capable war President.  If shares in defense contractors increase in value when the pro-war candidate’s electoral 
prospects improve, one might be tempted to conclude that the defense contractor’s stocks are worth more because there 
is a higher chance of the pro-war candidate will be elected.  However a third factor—such as threatening actions from a 
another nation—may have led both numbers to appreciate: the defense contractor’s from their increased sales in an 
increasingly likely war, and the pro-war candidate’s from his country’s increased need of his leadership in wartime. 
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II.  The 2004 Election 
During the 2004 election cycle, TradeSports.com created a contract that would pay $10 if 
Bush were elected President, and zero otherwise.  The price of this security yields a market-based 
estimate of the probability that Bush will win the election.5  We collected these Tradesports data on 
the last trade and bid-ask spread every 10 minutes during Election Day until the winner was 
determined in the early hours of the following morning.  We pair these data with the price of the last 
transaction in the same 10 minute period for the December 2004 futures contract of various financial 
variables: the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) S&P 500 and Nasdaq 100 futures, CME 
currency futures, the Chicago Board Of Trade (CBOT) Dow Jones Industrial Average and 2 and 10 
year Treasury Note futures, and a series of New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) Light Crude 
Oil futures.6  The precision of our estimates is enhanced by the low volatility in overnight financial 
markets,7  the dearth of non-election financial news on Election Night,8 and the substantial trading 
volume generated on the Tradesports political prediction markets.9 
Figure 1 shows the prediction market assessment of the probability of Bush’s re-election and 
the value of the S&P 500 future through our sample (noon EST on November 2nd through to 6am, 
November 3rd, 2004). The prices track each other quite closely. The probability of Bush winning the 
election starts near 55 percent. When the exit poll data was leaked, the markets quickly incorporated 
                                                 
5 Wolfers and Zitzewitz [2006] show that for realistic parameters regarding the risk aversion of traders, prediction 
market prices can be interpreted as a measure of the central tendency of beliefs about the probability of an event. 
6 We analyze futures rather than the actual indices because only the futures are actively traded in the period after regular 
trading hours.  The need to analyze data after the main U.S. markets closed also constrains the set of financial variables 
we can analyze. 
7 For example, in the fourth quarter of 2004, the standard deviation of 30-minute changes in the CME S&P 500 futures 
from 4pm to 3am the following morning was 7.8 basis points, compared with 28.3 basis points during regular trading 
hours.   While volatility was slightly higher on Election Night (the standard deviation of 30-minute changes was 10.2 
basis points), the R-squared in our 30-minute-difference regressions of 0.33 suggests this increased volatility was 
explained by news about the Presidential election. 
8 Counts of the number of earnings announcements recorded by I/B/E/S and news stories on the Dow Jones Newswire 
that did not include the words “Bush” or “Kerry” revealed that these measures were 39 and 23 percent lower on Election 
Day than their average on the two prior and two subsequent Tuesdays. 
9 On Election Day and the early hours of the following day, over $3.5 million was transacted in contracts predicting 
either a Bush or Kerry victory, in 13,366 separate trades.  The average bid-ask spread was 0.5% of the expiry value of a 
binary option.  In contrast, for the Iowa Electronic Market on the winner of the popular vote in 2000 (there was no 
prediction market security on the Electoral College winner), election day volume totaled less than $20,000. 
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this information, sending Bush’s probability of election to 30 percent and stocks down nearly one 
percent. When it became clear that the earlier exit poll data was faulty, Bush’s chances rose to 
95 percent and stocks rebounded, rising 1½ percent.  In both cases, it appears that the political news 
was reflected in the stock market slightly before the prediction market, mirroring what we found 
about Iraq War-related news in Wolfers and Zitzewitz [2005]. 
Figure 1 strongly suggests that equities were more valuable under a Bush Presidency than if 
Kerry had been elected.  In order to get a precise estimate of just how much higher, we can regress 
changes in the S&P 500 on changes in Bush’s chances of re-election.  Specifically, we estimate:10 
ΔLog(Financial variablet) = α + β ΔRe-election probabilityt + εt 
Whereas all 10-minute intervals contain at least one prediction market trade, there are some 
intervals with no fresh trade in at least one of the financial markets.  In these cases we analyze 
longer differences, weighting observations by the inverse of the number of periods the difference 
spans so as to correct for heteroskedasticity arising from unequal period lengths. 
The timing of market movements in Figure 1 suggests that the timing of incorporation of 
information into prices may be different in equity and prediction markets.  To allow for this 
possibility, we also estimate a version of the above model that uses 30-minute differences.  
Alternative specifications, such as 60-minute differences and Scholes-Williams [1977] regressions, 
yield coefficients of similar magnitude to the 30-minute differences. 
Table 1 shows the result of regressions analyzing changes in a number of different financial 
prices.  The coefficients can be interpreted as the percentage point difference in that indicator 
resulting from a Bush presidency instead of a Kerry Presidency.11 
                                                 
10 See Wolfers and Zitzewitz [2005] for a small model clarifying the assumptions under which this estimating equation 
reveals the structural parameters of interest. 
11 Since our first natural experiment occurred while polls were still open, it is possible that there was a feedback 
whereby news of the exit polls or market movements led to changes in voting behavior.  If both prediction and financial 
market traders were aware of this possibility—or if neither were aware—then our regression yields unbiased estimates.  
On the other hand, if the prediction markets over (under-)shot the change in probability of Bush’s election relative to the 
financial market, then our regression will yield under (over-)estimates.  Two robustness checks suggest that this is not 
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The results for the S&P 500 suggest a precisely estimated effect, with the Bush presidency 
yielding equity prices that are 1½ to 2 percent higher; other stock indices yield similar estimates.12,13  
Of course, the equity market effects could reflect expectations of stronger output growth, or of 
policy changes that are expected to favor returns to equity holders over debt holders, current over 
future taxpayers, capital over labor, or current firms over potential entrants. 
Some further insight into expected effects on output and inflation can be gained by 
examining real and nominal bond yields and the dollar.  The regressions in Table 1 suggest that 10-
year bond yields would be 11-12 basis points higher and 2-year bond yields 10-11 basis points 
higher under a Bush administration.  Ideally one would like to separate the effect of changes in 
expected inflation from changes in expected real interest rates.  While there was no overnight 
trading in inflation-protected Treasury bills, we do observe the value of a closely related asset—the 
iShares Lehman TIPS exchange traded fund (“TIP”)—at 3 pm, 4 pm, and 9:30 am the next morning. 
Table 2 displays the percent change in prices between these inflation-indexed assets and 
three comparison non-indexed assets: the 10 and 2-year CBOT Treasury futures, and the closest-
maturity non-TIP Treasury fund, the iShares Lehman 7-10 Year Treasury (“IEF”).14,15  The 
12 percentage point decline in Bush’s reelection probability from 3 to 4 pm was accompanied by a 
                                                                                                                                                                  
an important issue.  First, we examined exit poll data and found no evidence that differences between voting patterns in 
the morning, early afternoon and evening varied across time zones, despite greater exposure to the “news” of a Kerry 
victory in the west.  This suggests that this news did not change voter behavior.  Second, long-differences which are not 
identified from the variation due to the faulty exit poll reporting (e.g. analyzing changes from 1pm on election day until 
1am the next morning) yield results consistent with our main estimates. 
12 We also obtain similar results when we split the sample at 8pm EST (when the second natural experiment began) or 
10pm EST (when polls closed in all swing states), finding no significant differences in the coefficients during the two 
periods.  This gives us confidence that our first experiment is not biased and that it is appropriate to combine the two 
experiments.  (Indeed, comparing the outcomes across these two experiments can be thought of as an overidentification 
test). 
13 Our results are also robust to adding controls for the probability of Republican control of the House or Senate 
changing (by including the prices of the relevant Tradesports contracts as additional regressors).  This robustness is 
likely due to these probabilities varying little on Election Day – the probability of a Republican House and Senate varied 
between 90 and 95 and between 82 and 88 percent, respectively, before rising toward 100 late in the evening.  Our 
results are also robust to adding a control for the expected margin of victory, measured using Tradesports contracts on 
electoral college vote totals. 
14  We use the last trade before 3pm, the last trade before 4pm, and the first trade after 9:30am, respectively.  Results are 
qualitatively similar if we take a quantity-weighted average of trades in the surrounding 10 minute period. 
15  The duration of the holdings of  “TIP” and “IEF” is 5.9 and 6.6 years respectively, as calculated by Morningstar as of 
December 2004.  
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one or two basis point reduction in both nominal and real bond yields, while the 55 percentage point 
increase from 4 pm to 9:30 am the next morning was accompanied by a six to eight basis point 
increase in both real and nominal yields. Wald [1940] estimators constructed using these two 
windows yield results that are similar to our regressions in Table 1 for the bond futures, and suggest 
that the partisan effect on nominal bond yields was almost entirely due to changes in real interest 
rates, not expected inflation. 
Coupled with the strengthening of the dollar under Bush, this suggests that the move in 
interest rates reflected expectations of expansionary fiscal policies, rather than an increased risk of 
inflation or default.  Our estimate that Bush’s reelection raised December 2004 and 2005 crude oil 
prices by between $0.60 and $1.60 per barrel is also consistent with expectations of higher demand 
for oil due to economic expansion.16 
Our Election-Night natural experiment yields different results from the pure time series 
methods previously employed in the literature.  Table 3 reports regressions explaining changes in 
daily closing prices of various financial variables using changes in the 4pm price of the Bush 
reelection contract, over a sample running from the start of prediction market trading in June 2003 
to October 31, 2004.  As above, we analyze longer differences to allow for slow incorporation of 
information into the Bush reelection contract, which traded less liquidly during the 17 months 
leading up to Election Night (total volume during these months was about $11.4 million, about half 
of which was concentrated in September and October 2004).  The observed relationship between 
election and economic expectations through this period likely confounds the effects of politics on 
the economy with the effects of economic conditions on the election. 
The estimated “effect” of Bush’s reelection on the stock market in this analysis is roughly a 
factor of ten larger than in Table 1.  This suggests the bias in a naïve time series analysis is large, 
                                                 
16 Oil prices might also be expected to be higher under Bush due to reduced conservation or reduced supply, but these 
explanations appear inconsistent with the term structure of the effect and with the candidates’ positions on encouraging 
exploration. 
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and that much of the correlation between equity markets and Bush’s re-election probability in pre-
election data reflects reverse causation (e.g., higher stock prices help Bush) or third-factor causation 
(e.g., a stronger economy helps both Bush and the stockmarket). 
For oil prices, these biases appear to cause a sign reversal.  While Table 1 showed that 
Bush’s re-election was expected to lead to higher oil prices, the results in Table 3 also reflect the 
reverse channel, whereby lower oil prices helped Bush’s reelection chances.  This reverse channel 
appears to be the dominant source of variation in the pre-election data, producing the negative 
correlation.  The contrasting estimates in Tables 1 and 3 highlight the inadequacies of estimates of 
partisan effects that simply reflect the correlation between economic and electoral conditions. 
Given that the results in Tables 1 and 2 reflect the effects of Bush on the economy, while 
those in Table 3 reflect both the effects of Bush on the economy and the effects of the economy on 
Bush, it seems reasonable to infer that we can combine these analyses to learn something about the 
effect of the economy on Bush’s chances of re-election.  We start by noting the following structural 
equations: 
ΔLog(Financial variablet) = β ΔRe-election probabilityt  + εt    (1) 
ΔRe-election probabilityt = γ ΔLog(Financial variablet) + ηt    (2) 
εt~D(0, σε2);  ηt~D(0, ση2);  E[εtηt]= ρηεσεση               (3); (4); (5)  
Note that this system involves five unknowns (β, γ, σε2, ση2 and ρηε) while we observe only 
three relevant moments (the variance of the financial variable and the re-election probability, and 
their covariance).  Separately, our analysis of Election-Day shocks gives us an estimate of β, 
implying that only one further assumption (about the correlation between the two structural shocks, 
ρηε) is required to recover estimates of the effect of the economy on Bush’s re-election prospects (γ). 
To show the relevant intuition, if we estimate equation (2) by OLS, we obtain: 
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γOLS  = νγ + (1-ν)β-1  where t t t t t
t t t t t t
2
2 2 22
ε ε η ε η
ε ε η ε η η
σ βρ σ σν σ βρ σ σ β σ
+= + +      (6) 
We can gain some intuition about the magnitude of ν by noting that it can be roughly 
interpreted as the share of financial market movements due to non-political factors.  Specifically, 
since we know from Table 1 that β is small, and hence if the correlation between the political and 
economic shocks (ρηε) is also small then ν will be close to one, suggesting that the OLS estimate of 
the effects of shocks to the economy on Bush’s re-election probability will suffer only a small bias. 
Running an OLS regression to estimate [2] using daily first differences (exactly as the first 
row of Table 3, except with independent and dependent variables reversed) yields: 
ΔRe-election probabilityt =  0.233 ΔLog(S&P 500t) – 0.0004  Adj. R2 = 0.017 
             (.083)     (.0007)  n = 321 
 
While statistically significant, these estimated effects seem rather small relative to the larger 
magnitudes found in the economic voting literature.  Equally, OLS estimates of the effect of 
elections on the economy get larger as the election approaches.  Reliably statistically significant 
results are only obtained in the two quarters leading up to the election, potentially providing some 
support for the finding in Fair [1978] that economic factors are particularly relevant for electoral 
outcomes when election day is nearer.17 
That said, it seems plausible that political and economic shocks may be strongly correlated.  
If the correlation between the shocks is non-negative (for example when good news about foreign 
affairs causes rallies in both the stockmarket and Bush’s re-election prospects), then the OLS 
                                                 
17 Ideally to determine the effect of the economy on electoral outcomes we would rely on an instrumental variables 
strategy that isolated economic shocks that did not also change the political environment directly.  We have considered 
and discarded many such possible instruments, and leave this as an open question for future research. 
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regression provides a useful upper bound, as the true causal effect of economic conditions, γ, will lie 
below our reported γOLS.18 
 
III.  Bush versus Gore 
Our analysis of the 2004 election in Table 1 alone does not allow us to disentangle whether 
the estimated effects are due to the election of a Republican (and hence reflect partisan effects), or 
the re-election of a sitting president (reflecting the benefits of stability).  As such, we would like to 
be able to repeat this analysis for the 2000 election, in which there was no incumbent candidate 
running, and the Democrats were the incumbent party.  Figure 2 illustrates that there were sharp 
movements in major financial indicators during the vote count, and these appear to coincide sharp 
shocks to assessments of the probability of Bush or Gore winning. 
Unfortunately, we do not have an accurate estimate of the probability of victory of either 
candidate since there were no contracts that tracked this. The Iowa Electronic markets only tracked 
the anticipated popular vote share of each candidate, and the probability that each candidate would 
win a plurality of the popular vote.  Since the winner of the popular vote (Gore) did not win the 
election, and it was quite clear early on Election Night that this was likely, the Iowa market price 
cannot be used as an estimate of the probability that a given candidate would win the election. 
Centrebet, an Australian bookmaker, did trade an appropriate contract, but closed their market on 
the morning of the election. Their election-morning odds suggested that Bush had a 60% chance of 
winning the election. We can use this number to bound the effect of Bush versus Gore on economic 
indicators. 
If we assume that the prices of the various indicators at the beginning of our sample period 
correspond to a 60% chance of Bush winning, then the decline observed between 6pm and 9pm 
                                                 
18 Another way to show this logic is to note that equations (1) – (5) imply that: 
( )( )2 2Bush EconomyCov( Bush, Economy)+E[ ] Cov( Bush, Economy)-γ βσ εη β σ= −  yielding an estimate of γ for any assumption about the 
only unobservable, E[εη].  This implies that one needs to impose at least some further assumptions about E[εη] for our 
data to impose bounds on possible values of γ. 
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cannot represent more than a 60% decrease in the chance of a Bush victory.  Likewise, the change 
from 9pm to 2:15am cannot represent more than a 100% increase in the probability of a Bush win.  
From this, Table 4 infers bounds on the relevant Wald Estimators of the effect of Bush versus Gore, 
finding that a Bush presidency caused at least a 1½% increase in the S&P 500, a 3½% increase in 
the Nasdaq 100 and a ½% appreciation of the dollar versus a trade weighted currency portfolio.  The 
estimates from these two experiments in 2000 are consistent both with each other and with the 
effects observed over the two analogous experiments in 2004, suggesting that our estimates are 
isolating partisan effects rather than the costs of transferring from an incumbent regime to a new 
one. 
 
IV.  A Century of Elections 
 Because the 2000 and 2004 elections are the only two close elections since overnight trading 
began, we cannot replicate the above analysis for earlier elections.  However, we can perform a 
more traditional event study, comparing aggregate returns from the pre-election close to the post-
election close (the narrowest event window possible given that historically equity markets were 
closed on Election Day).  Naturally the identifying assumption in this case—that markets are 
responding to election returns rather than other news—is more tenuous over this longer event 
window.  (This is an important reason that our estimates from this analysis will be less precise.) 
Santa-Clara and Valkanov [2003] have previously compared event returns accompanying 
Democratic and Republican victories, finding no consistent pattern.  However, as Shelton [2005] 
has emphasized, it is important to distinguish elections which transmit essentially no news (such as 
a market rally coinciding with Clinton’s widely expected re-election in 1996) from elections 
involving large shocks (Truman surprisingly beating Dewey in 1948).  Thus we once again turn to 
prediction markets in order to highlight the relationship between equity market movements and 
electoral surprises.  Data on election betting back to 1880 were pieced together from a variety of 
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sources.  Paul Rhode and Koleman Strumpf were particularly helpful, providing results from the 
“Curb Market”—a large scale political market that operated on the curb of Wall Street through most 
of this period.  This market is probably best described as an historical open-outcry version of the 
modern Tradesports markets, and is described in Rhode and Strumpf [2004, 2005]. These data were 
supplemented with alternative sources for recent decades, including British and Australian 
bookmakers, the Iowa Electronic Markets, and Tradesports.19  Combining these prediction market 
data with election outcomes yields a simple measure of the resulting partisan shock:20 
        Partisan Shockt = I(Republican President electedt) – Probability of a Republican presidentt-1. 
In order to compile a long-run series of daily stock returns, we analyze movements in 
Schwert’s [1990] daily equity returns data (which attempts to replicate returns on a value-weighted 
total return index) supplemented by returns on the CRSP-value-weighted portfolio since 1962, and 
data from Kalinke [2004] prior to 1888. 
Figure 3 shows that historically equity markets have risen when Republican presidents have 
been elected, and the larger the surprise, the more they rise.  This is in apparent conflict with Santa-
Clara and Valkanov [2003], who find no systematic relationship, albeit between equity returns and 
the sign of the electoral surprise (i.e., whether a Republican is elected). 
Table 5 attempts to reconcile these two results, initially analyzing relationship between 
return and sign for Santa-Clara and Valkanov’s 1928-1996 sample.  As with their analysis, we find a 
positive, but insignificant, relationship when only analyzing whether the Republican Party wins the 
election.  If instead we exploit our prediction market data to account for the magnitude of the 
electoral surprise, our results are clearly significant, and they are slightly more so when we expand 
to the full 1880 to 2004 time period for which we can obtain the needed data.  A final specification 
                                                 
19 See the Appendix for details on the construction of these prediction market data. 
20 This measure of the partisan shock revealed by the vote count is valid only if the election winner is known by the end 
of the event window.  We have checked press reports of each election, and this assumption is only potentially 
problematic for the 1916 and 2000 elections.  Dropping these elections from the regressions in Table 5 yields slightly 
stronger results. 
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jointly analyzes both our variable describing the partisan shock (measured as the change in beliefs 
that a Republican would be elected) and the change in expectations that the incumbent party would 
be re-elected, again finding strong evidence that partisanship, rather than incumbency effects are 
driving our results.21 
Thus, this analysis finds further evidence of statistically and economically significant 
partisan effects on equity markets, and robustness checking suggests that these estimates are not 
driven by specific outliers.22  Moreover, the estimated magnitude is remarkably similar to our 
assessments based on intra-day movements in the 2000 and 2004 elections, with the election of a 
Republican president calculated to have typically been associated with a 2-3 percent rise in equity 
prices.  The statistical power of our election-night approach is illustrated by the relative precision of 
the estimates in Tables 1 and Table 5: our estimate of partisan effects from a single night 
(11/2/2004) yielded standard errors one-half as large those on our estimate using daily data from the 
last 124 years of Presidential elections, reflecting the fact that over a ten-minute period there are 
fewer unrelated shocks to financial markets creating noise.  Equally, the analysis of historical data is 
also likely shaped by the fact that there is heterogeneity in the ideology and quality of the specific 
Republican candidates, and this heterogeneity is not present in the single-election case studies. 
 Figure 4 turns to bond yields showing that they were historically quite unresponsive to 
political shocks until the election of Reagan in 1980 when the yield on the 10-year Treasury bill 
increased 15 basis points. Prediction markets viewed the chances of his election at 80%.  Regressing 
changes in bond yields on the change in probability of a Republican president as in Table 5 reveals 
                                                 
21 There are many ways to define incumbency from incumbent parties to the incumbency of a particular candidate. We 
tested several specifications along this spectrum and found all yielded similar conclusions.  We also allowed the 
incumbency effect to vary with the incumbent’s performance, interacting the incumbency effect with various measures 
of economic performance, and again found evidence of partisan but not incumbency or performance effects. 
22 We are unable to test the effect of party in control of congress since this would require knowledge of the market’s 
assessment of the probability of a change in congressional control. Prediction markets did not track this before 1994. If 
we assume that a certain proportion of seats going into an election would give a party near certainty of maintaining 
congressional control we can test whether a President winning with control of Congress creates different returns then 
winning without. We varied the necessary margin of control from 0.5 to 0.72 in increments of 0.01 and found that at no 
level was there a statistically significant effect of winning with control of Congress versus winning without. 
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that there was no statistically or economically significant difference in the reaction of bond markets 
to Democratic or Republican candidates from 1920 to 1976. From 1980 onward a Republican 
President increased the 10-year bill yield 13 basis points (p=0.15). Although we have few 
observations, this pattern is consistent with both the relatively low national debt before 1980 and a 
re-alignment of the political parties with regard to government debt after 1980. 
 
V.  Discussion 
Large natural experiments caused by flawed election-evening psephology yielded large and 
plausibly exogenous shocks to the perceived probability of Bush winning both the 2000 and 2004 
elections, enabling us to estimate the causal effect of alternative Presidential candidates on various 
financial indices. 
Our estimates are informative for various questions in the political economy literature.  
Specifically, partisan political business-cycle models specify that parties have different intrinsic 
policy goals.  An immediate implication of these theories is that changes in election probabilities 
generate shocks to expectations about macroeconomic policy, and indeed we find that changes in 
the perceived probability of electing a Republican President caused changes in expected bond 
yields, equity and oil prices.  A closer inspection of our results yielded somewhat more surprising 
insights.  The finding that equity values were expected to be 2-3 percent higher under Bush are 
easily reconciled with expectations of favored treatment of capital over labor, current firms over 
future entrants, equity over bond holders, or expectations of stronger real activity.  Long bond yields 
were expected to be 10 to 12 basis points higher under Bush, a finding at odds with the usual 
characterization of right-wing parties as more strongly committed to balancing the budget, even if 
the cost is lower economic activity.  That said, this finding is consistent with observed higher 
deficits under Republicans since the 1980s.  Finally, while the literature so far has focused on 
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election outcomes as generating monetary or fiscal shocks, our oil price results suggest that 
macroeconomic “supply shocks” might also reflect partisan preferences. 
An older strand of the literature claims that candidates and parties will converge to the same 
policy—that of the median voter.  Under this view, changing policies reflect changing preferences 
of voters, rather than changes in the officeholder, and disentangling the two makes falsification of 
the theory all the more difficult.  Our analysis suggests that financial markets do not believe that 
policy convergence occurs.  While Jayachandran [2006] and Knight [2006] have shown evidence of 
partisanship affecting particular groups of firms differentially, our data speak to broader 
macroeconomic effects. 
The reason that we have emphasized the importance of analyzing the effects of exogenous 
shocks to the probability of re-election is that under retrospective economic voting a simple time 
series regression of financial prices on re-election probabilities will confound the causal effects of 
an incumbent’s policies on financial markets with the effects of expectations about the economy 
changing expectations about the incumbent’s re-election prospects.  Our natural experiments allow 
us to isolate the former, and the fact that this yields substantially different results from the longer 
time series points to the importance of the economic voting channel highlighted by Fair [1978]. 
Our results are contrary to the findings of Santa-Clara and Valkanov [2003] who find no 
sharp changes on Election Day, but large excess returns under Democratic administrations.  The 
greater statistical power of our approach resolves our differences regarding the former observation, 
while reconciliations of the latter include the possibility that: 1) Past Democratic Presidents pursued 
policies that were more beneficial for equity returns, but investors have not noticed; 2) Past 
Democratic Presidents have pursued beneficial policies, but investors do not expect future ones to 
do so; and 3) Partisan effects are small relative to the variance of equity returns during a Presidential 
term, and past Democratic Presidents have simply been lucky in this regard. 
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Finally, our results speak directly to the question asked by Jones and Olken [2005] as to 
whether leaders matter.  Those authors also emphasize the fact that a country’s leaders both 
determine and are determined by their economic performance and hence analyze the effects of 
clearly exogenous shocks caused by unexpected leader deaths, finding large effects on growth.  
Similarly, Fisman [2001] analyzes financial market implications of shocks to President Suharto’s 
health.  Our approach is similar in that we analyze the effects of unexpected changes to beliefs about 
election outcomes. 
While our results are informative in a wide variety of settings, it is also important to point 
out their shortcomings.  In that we limit ourselves to U.S. Presidential elections, our analysis has 
sacrificed generality for precision.  Our observations reflect changing expectations among financial 
market traders, rather than actual partisan differences; the partisan differences we estimate for 2000 
and 2004 reflect the particularities of Bush versus Gore or Kerry rather than the more general 
leanings of the Democratic or Republican parties; and the complexity of the platforms of Kerry and 
Bush do not permit us to draw strong conclusions about which policies lead to the effects we 
observe. 
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Table 1 
Effects of Bush versus Kerry on Financial Variables 
10 Minute First Differences 30 Minute First DifferencesDependent Variable 
Estimated Effect of 
Bush Presidency 
n Estimated Effect of 
Bush Presidency 
N 
 Dependent Variable: ΔLog(Financial Index) 
S&P 500 0.015*** 
(.004) 
104 0.021*** 
(.005) 
35 
Dow Jones Industrial Average 0.014*** 
(.005) 
84 0.021*** 
(.006) 
29 
Nasdaq 100 0.017*** 
(.006) 
104 0.024*** 
(.008) 
35 
U.S. Dollar 
(vs. Trade-weighted basket) 
0.004 
(.003) 
93 0.005** 
(.003) 
34 
  Dependent Variable: ΔPrice 
December ‘04 1.110*** 
(.371) 
88 1.706** 
(.659) 
29 
December ‘05 0.652* 
(.375) 
85 1.020 
(.610) 
28 Light  Crude Oil  
Futures December ‘06 -0.580 
(.783) 
63 -0.666 
(.863) 
21 
 Dependent Variable: ΔYield 
2 Year T-Note Future 0.104* 
(.058) 
84 0.108*** 
(.036) 
30 
10 Year T-Note Future 0.112** 
(.050) 
91 0.120** 
(.046) 
31 
Notes: ***, **, * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. (White [1980] standard errors in 
parentheses.) The sample period is noon Eastern Time on 11/2/2004 to six a.m. on 11/3/2004.  Election probabilities are 
the most recent transaction prices collected every ten minutes from Tradesports.com.  S&P, Nasdaq, and foreign 
exchange futures are from the Chicago Mercantile Exchange; Dow and bond futures are from the Chicago Board of 
Trade, while oil futures data are from the New York Mercantile Exchange.  Equity, bond and currency futures have 
December 2004 delivery dates.  Yields are calculated for the Treasury futures using the daily yields reported by the 
Federal Reserve for 2 and 10-year Treasuries and projecting forward and backward from the bond market close at 3 pm 
using future price changes and the future’s durations of 1.96 and 7.97 reported by CBOT.  The trade-weighted currency 
portfolio includes six currencies with CME-traded futures (the Euro, Yen, Pound, Australian and Canadian dollars, and 
the Swiss Franc). 
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Table II 
Changes in bond yields were unrelated to changes in inflation expectations 
 
1st Natural Experiment 
3 - 4pm 11/2/2004 
2nd Natural Experiment 
4pm  - 9:30am 11/2/2004 - 11/3/2004 
 ΔProb(Bush) = -12% ΔProb(Bush) = 55% 
 Wald Estimator: Wald Estimator: 
 
Δ(Yield)    Δ(Yield)  _ 
ΔProb(Bush) 
Δ(Yield)    Δ(Yield)  _ 
ΔProb(Bush) 
Inflation-indexed yields    
Lehman TIPS  
ETF ("TIP") -0.020% 0.16% 0.040% 0.11% 
Non-indexed yields    
Lehman 7-10 year  
Treasury ETF ("IEF") -0.020% 0.16% 0.061% 0.15% 
CBOT 10 year  
Treasury Note -0.009% 0.07% 0.050% 0.11% 
CBOT 2 year  
Treasury -0.015% 0.13% 0.030% 0.08% 
Notes: For the TIP and IEF exchange traded funds (ETF), the implied yield for 3 pm is taken to be the constant-maturity daily 
yield calculated by the Federal Reserve for TIPS and Treasuries with the closest maturity to average holdings of the ETFs 
(7 years in both cases).  For the 10 and 2-year CBOT Treasury futures, the 10 and 2-year series are used. These yields are then 
projected forward using price changes and the average duration of the funds' holdings, as reported by Morningstar in 
December 2004. 
 
Table III 
Re-election Probabilities and Financial Variables Through the Campaign 
Daily differences 5-day differences 20-day differences Independent Variable: 
ΔBush election probability Estimate n Estimate n Estimate N 
 Dependent Variable: ΔLog(Financial Index) 
S&P 500 0.087**
(.034)
321 0.128**
(.062)
317 0.243***
(.065)
302 
Dow Jones Industrial Average 0.093***
(.032)
321 0.145**
(.061)
317 0.275***
(.090)
302 
Nasdaq 100 0.143**
(.062)
321 0.212**
(.098)
317 0.299***
(.108)
302 
U.S. Dollar 
(vs. Trade-weighted basket) 
0.040**
(.019)
321 0.017
(.022)
317 -0.022
(.047)
302 
  Dependent Variable: ΔPrice 
Light Crude Oil Futures 
(Near month) 
0.390
(4.504)
318 -7.221
(7.188)
314 -12.547*
(6.793)
299 
 Dependent Variable: ΔYield 
10 Year T-Bill Yield 1.130***
(.373)
321 0.463
(.489)
317 -0.028
(.718)
302 
Notes: ***, **, * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  Newey-West [1987] standard errors 
in parentheses, allowing for autocorrelation over 1, 5 and 20 lags, respectively.  Financial variables are daily closing 
prices.  The U.S. dollar is measures relative to a trade-weighted basket of the same currencies as in Table 1. 
Sample covers all trading days from June 2003 to October 2004. 
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Table IV 
Natural Experiments in 2000 provide estimates in line with those from 2004. 
 
1st Natural Experiment 
6pm – 9pm 11/6/2000 
2nd Natural Experiment 
9pm  - 2:15am 11/6/2000 – 11/7/2000 
 0% ≥ ΔProb(Bush) ≥ -60% 0% ≤ ΔProb(Bush) ≤ 100% 
 Wald Estimator: Wald Estimator: 
 
%Δ(Price)    %Δ(Price)  _ 
ΔProb(Bush) 
%Δ(Price)    %Δ(Price)  _ 
ΔProb(Bush) 
S&P 500 -0.9% ≥1.4% 1.6% ≥1.6% 
Nasdaq 100 -2.3% ≥3.8% 3.5% ≥3.5% 
U.S. Dollar 
(vs. Trade-weighted basket) -0.3% ≥0.5% 0.6% ≥0.6% 
Notes: Election Night events indicate that the highest probability of a Bush loss occurred around 9pm, and the highest probability of a 
Bush win occurred at 2:15 am the next morning. We made this determination based on the timeline found at: 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/media/election2000/election_night.html 
 
 
 
 
Table V 
 The Effect of a Republican on Value-Weighted Equity Returns 
 Dependent Variable:  
Stock returns from election-eve close to post-election 
close  
I(GOP President) 
[As in Santa-Clara and Valkanov] 
0.0129 
(.0089) 
   
ΔProb(GOP President) 
(Prediction markets) 
 0.0297**
(.118) 
0.0249*** 
(.0082) 
0.0242***
(.0084) 
ΔProb(Incumbent party elected) 
(Prediction markets) 
   -0.0038 
(.0085) 
Constant -0.0102 
(.0059) 
-0.0027 
(.0040) 
0.0014 
(.0028) 
0.0013 
(.0028) 
Sample 
N 
1928 – 1996 
18 
1928 – 1996 
18 
1880 – 2004 
32 
1880 – 2004 
32 
Notes:  ***, ** and * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%.  (White standard errors in parentheses.) 
 See Appendix for further details on construction of variables 
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Figure I 
The S&P 500 is higher under a Bush versus Kerry presidency. 
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Figure II 
Bush had similar effects on economic indicators compared to Kerry or Gore. 
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Notes: Timing of events are taken from: http://www.pbs.org/newshour/media/election2000/election_night.html 
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Figure III 
Equity markets have historically preferred Republican presidents. 
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 Figure IV 
Bond markets before 1980 did not react to elections. 
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Appendix Table 
Expected and Actual Election Results, 1880-2004. 
Year Democrat 
candidate 
Republican 
candidate 
Prediction 
market: 
Prob(GOP 
Win) 
Gallup 
poll: 
Expected 
GOP Vote 
Share (2pp) 
Winner GOP 
Popular 
Vote Share 
(2 party 
vote share) 
Partisan 
Shock 
I(GOP Pres) - 
p(GOP Pres). 
%ΔStock 
(t-1 to t+1) 
Regression 
Residual 
(Table 5, 
col. 3) 
1880 Hancock Garfield 75.2% n.a. Garfield 50.01% 24.8% -0.59% -1.35% 
1884 Cleveland Blaine 52.8% n.a. Cleveland 49.87% -52.8% -1.25% -0.07% 
1888 Cleveland Harrison 50.0% n.a. Harrison 49.59% 50.0% 0.40% -0.98% 
1892 Cleveland Harrison 50.8% n.a. Cleveland 48.26% -50.8% 0.20% 1.33% 
1896 Bryan McKinley 79.9% n.a. McKinley 52.19% 20.1% 3.33% 2.69% 
1900 Bryan McKinley 82.4% n.a. McKinley 53.17% 17.6% 2.48% 1.90% 
1904 Parker T. Roosevelt 83.3% n.a. T. Roosevelt 60.01% 16.7% 0.98% 0.42% 
1908 Bryan Taft 85.7% n.a. Taft 54.51% 14.3% 2.01% 1.52% 
1912 Wilson T. Roosevelt (P) 
/ Taft (Rep.) 
9.1% 
(=pRep+pProg)
n.a. Wilson 39.56% 
(Roosevelt) 
-9.1% 1.73% 1.82% 
1916 Wilson Hughes 51.8% n.a. Hughes 48.36% -51.8% -0.44% 0.71% 
1920 Cox Harding 91.7% n.a. Harding 63.88% 8.3% 0.94% 0.60% 
1924 Davis Coolidge 96.9% n.a. Coolidge 65.21% 3.1% 1.30% 1.08% 
1928 Smith Hoover 83.3% n.a. Hoover 58.82% 16.7% 1.19% 0.64% 
1932 F. Roosevelt Hoover 17.4% n.a. F. Roosevelt 40.84% -17.4% -4.40% -4.10% 
1936 F. Roosevelt Landon 28.1% 44.3% F. Roosevelt 37.54% -28.1% 1.55% 2.12% 
1940 F. Roosevelt Wilkie 33.3% 48.0% F. Roosevelt 45.00% -33.3% -3.27% -2.58% 
1944 F. Roosevelt Dewey 20.8% 48.5% F. Roosevelt 46.34% -20.8% -0.11% 0.26% 
1948 Truman Dewey 88.9% 52.7% Truman 47.63% -88.9% -4.56% -2.49% 
1952 Stevenson Eisenhower 54.6% 51.0% Eisenhower 55.40% 45.4% 0.34% -0.93% 
1956 Stevenson Eisenhower 80.0% 59.5% Eisenhower 57.76% 20.0% -0.99% -1.63% 
1960 Kennedy Nixon 38.5% 49.0% Kennedy 49.91% -38.5% 0.47% 1.29% 
1964 Johnson Goldwater 0.3% 36.0% Johnson 38.66% -0.3% 0.00% -0.13% 
1968 Humphrey Nixon 54.5% 50.6% Nixon 50.40% 45.5% 0.18% -1.09% 
1972 McGovern Nixon 99.0% 62.0% Nixon 61.79% 1.0% -0.46% -0.62% 
1976 Carter Ford 53.2% 50.5% Carter 48.95% -53.2% -1.14% 0.05% 
1980 Carter Reagan 76.8% 51.6% Reagan 55.30% 23.2% 1.73% 1.01% 
1984 Mondale Reagan 83.2% 59.0% Reagan 59.17% 16.8% 0.31% -0.25% 
1988 Dukakis G.H.W. Bush 81.1% 56.0% G.H.W. Bush 53.90% 18.9% -0.16% -0.77% 
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1992 Clinton G.H.W Bush 7.8% 43.0% Clinton 46.54% -7.8% -1.02% -0.97% 
1996 Clinton Dole 7.0% 44.1% Clinton 45.34% -7.0% 2.27% 2.30% 
2000 Gore G.W. Bush 61.5% 51.1% Gore 49.73% 38.5% -0.55% -1.65% 
2004 Kerry G.W. Bush 55.0% 50.0% G.W. Bush 51.24% 45.0% 1.15% -0.11% 
          
Averages (with standard errors)        
Democrat winner  32.8% 
(6.6) 
46.2% 
(1.7) 
n=14 45.2% 
(1.1) 
-32.8% 
(6.6) 
-0.71% 
(.57) 
-0.03% 
(.51) 
   As underdog (pDem<.5) 59.5% 
(7.4) 
51.6% 
(1.1) 
n=5 48.6% 
(0.4) 
-59.5% 
(7.4) 
-1.44% 
(0.82) 
-0.09% 
(.65) 
    As favorite (pDem≥.5) 18.0% 
(4.4) 
44.7% 
(1.7) 
n=9 43.3% 
(1.4) 
-18.0% 
(4.4) 
-0.31% 
(.75) 
0.00 
(.74) 
Republican winner  76.3% 
(3.5) 
54.5% 
(1.5) 
n=18 55.7% 
(1.17) 
23.7% +0.76% 
(.27) 
0.03% 
(.30) 
   As underdog (pRep<.5) n.a. n.a. n=0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
   As favorite (pRep≥.5) 76.3% 
(3.5) 
54.5% 
(1.5) 
n=18 55.67% 
(1.17) 
23.7% 
(3.5) 
+0.76% 
(.27) 
0.03% 
(.30) 
Data Sources:  
Political prediction markets: For 1880-1960, we analyze data provided to us by Rhode and Strumpf who collected press reports of the Curb Market on Wall 
Street.  Rhode and Strumpf [2004, 2005] provide greater detail about this market.  For 1976-1988, we rely on press reports of betting odds with British 
bookmakers; for 1992-1996, we use data from the Iowa Electronic Markets (although these are predictions of the winner of the popular vote).  In 2000 we use 
data provided by Centrebet, an online bookmaker and for 2004 we use Tradesports data. We were unable to obtain prediction market data for the 1964-1972; our 
probability assessments for these periods are derived by estimating the following relationship between prediction market prices and two-party predicted vote 
shares from the final pre-election Gallup poll:  
Prediction market price= Φ-1(Poll-0.5/σ), where Φ-1(.)  is the inverse normal cdf. 
Using non-linear least squares, we estimated σ=4.9, with a standard error of 1.0.  Note that our method for estimating a probability is not crucial to the results, 
since in 1964 and 1972 the eventual winner was at least 20 points ahead in front in the final Gallup poll, while the final poll in 1968 was virtually a dead heat. 
Equity Returns: Are measured from the market the close on the day prior to the election to the close the following day.  (For most of the sample, financial 
markets were closed on Election Day).  Estimates of returns to a value-weighted return index come from CRSP for 1964-2004 and Schwert [1990] for 1888-
1960, and for 1880-1884, we use Kalinke’s [2004] 12 stock average. 
Gallup poll data: For 1936-2004 reflect the Gallup organization’s final pre-poll projections of the two-party vote share.  Historical data are from 
www.gallup.com. 
Election results: Are reported as shares of the popular vote earned by the two most popular candidates.  For the 1912 election, Taft, the Republican candidate 
was effectively the third party, and hence we report Roosevelt as if he were the Republican candidate. 
Partisan shock: Measures the change in the probability of a Republican president from the day prior to the election, to the day after.  We measure this shock as: 
I(Republican President) – p(Republican presidentt-1), where the pre-election probability of a Republican president comes from political prediction markets. 
 
